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PROBING THE EFFECTS OF 
JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 
LAWRENCE BAUM† 
Americans typically think of judges as generalists. For some 
people, this quality is highly desirable or even inherent in the role of 
judge.1 But in reality, the judiciary includes a good deal of 
specialization, and the extent of that specialization has increased over 
time. People within and outside the courts have given considerable 
attention to some aspects of that development, but they have not 
sufficiently considered the implications of the extent and growth of 
judicial specialization. 
In their article, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew 
Wistrich address one important implication—the impact of 
specialization on the behavior of judges.2 Specifically, they consider 
how the specialization of most administrative law judges affects the 
ways they make choices. In this Response, I consider more broadly 
how specialization can affect judges’ behavior as well as the task of 
ascertaining its effects. I argue that specialization can have powerful 
effects on judicial decisions through immersion of judges in specific 
fields of legal policy and judicial expertise and through the enhanced 
influence of political and legal interests in those fields. At present, 
understanding of those effects is limited. Because of the potential 
importance of those effects, more concerted efforts by scholars to 
identify them would have great value. 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Lawrence Baum. 
 † Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University. I appreciate ideas and 
suggestions on the issues discussed in this Response from James Brudney, Mitu Gulati, David 
Klein, and Isaac Unah. 
 1. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
53 (1968) (“To the extent that [courts] specialize, they lose the one quality that clearly 
distinguishes them from administrative lawmakers.”). 
 2. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An 
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1479 (2009). 
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I.  THE RACHLINSKI, GUTHRIE, AND WISTRICH STUDY 
Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wistrich (the authors) have carried out 
a series of well-designed experimental studies in which they analyze 
the cognitive processes of judges as decisionmakers.3 To oversimplify 
a theoretical formulation and set of findings that are both rich and 
complex, the authors have found that judges are susceptible to the 
same imperfections in reasoning as other people: essentially, they rely 
heavily on intuitive thinking (as distinguished from deliberative 
thinking). Intuitive thinking has some advantages for decisionmaking, 
but it tends to foster faulty judgments. To take one example, judges 
are susceptible to “anchoring.” One manifestation of anchoring is that 
simply informing judges of a high demand by the plaintiff causes them 
to award more money than they would without that information.4 
In most of the authors’ research, the participating judges have 
been generalists, in that they deal with a wide array of cases in their 
work. But one of their past studies concerned bankruptcy judges,5 
who are certainly specialists. In the parts of the bankruptcy study that 
were comparable with the authors’ research on generalist judges, they 
found similar reliance on intuitive thinking. In the parts of the study 
for which there were no directly comparable findings on generalist 
judges, however, the bankruptcy judges did well in disregarding 
considerations that would detract from the quality of decisionmaking. 
This result left open the possibility that the specialization of 
bankruptcy judges improves the processes by which they reach 
decisions. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges with more 
experience in the job did not differ substantially from less 
experienced judges. This finding suggests that time spent in the role 
 
 3. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–42 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench] (offering ways that the judicial system can encourage judges to think 
deliberatively); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–84 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind] (exploring the impact of cognitive illusions on judicial decisions empirically); Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information: 
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1258–59 (2005) (discussing 
judges’ inability to ignore inadmissible information). 
 4. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
 5. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy 
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2006) (using bankruptcy judges as a case study to 
examine the impact of specialization on judicial decisions). 
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of a specialized judge does not affect the decisionmaking processes 
that the study analyzed.6 
The authors’ article for this Symposium examines another set of 
judges—administrative law judges. As they point out, these judges are 
quite important because of their large numbers and thus the volume 
of cases that they decide at the state and federal levels.7 Moreover, as 
controversies over the work of federal immigration judges suggest,8 
their decisions help to shape policy on major issues. 
Many, probably most, administrative law judges are specialists in 
the work of a single administrative agency,9 so a study of their 
decisionmaking provides another vantage point on judging by 
specialists. Further, as the authors point out, administrative law 
judges who work within a single agency are more accountable for 
their decisions than are judges within the judicial branch. As a 
consequence, they receive a relatively large volume of feedback on 
their performance.10 Thus, comparison of administrative law judges 
with generalist judges in the judicial branch provides a means to 
probe the impact of both accountability and specialization on 
judgment. 
The authors’ findings on administrative law judges are similar to 
the findings of their studies of generalist judges.11 Although most of 
the judges in this study were specialists in a particular subject matter, 
for the most part they engaged in the same intuitive decisionmaking 
as the nonspecialists who participated in earlier studies. Thus this 
study provides evidence that specialization does not have a 
substantial effect on how judges think through their choices. 
There is an unavoidable limitation to this study and the other 
studies that the authors have carried out. Like experimental research 
in general, their work maximizes internal validity, but with a potential 
 
 6. See id. at 1256–59 (“[T]he bankruptcy judges performed much like the generalist judges 
we have previously studied.”). 
 7. See Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 1479. 
 8. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Phillip G. Schrag, Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 302 (2007); Nina Bernstein, 
New York’s Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at 
A1; Pamela A. MacLean, Immigration Bench Plagued by Flaws, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1. 
 9. See Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 1478. 
 10. See id. at 1483–91. 
 11. See id. at 1480. 
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cost in external validity.12 In other words, the experimental setting 
allows researchers to control or exclude influences on behavior other 
than those in which they are interested, but that setting differs from 
the situations in which the behavior that interests researchers actually 
occurs. More specifically, the authors asked judges to carry out 
decisionmaking tasks in a context different from the one in which 
they decide actual cases. For one thing, judges often have more time 
to reach decisions than the experimental setting provides. Another 
difference is that judges ordinarily make decisions after hearing from 
both sides, so that they get multiple and competing perspectives on 
the questions they resolve. Moreover, in the study of administrative 
law judges, the wide range of specialties for those judges made it 
impossible to give them decisionmaking tasks in the experiment that 
matched their fields of specialization. (The authors did match tasks to 
specialization in the bankruptcy study.)13 Thus, extrapolating from the 
study findings to judicial decisionmaking requires caution. 
This caution, however, should not obscure the importance of the 
authors’ findings in the study of administrative law judges and its 
predecessors. Those findings serve as a reminder that, despite their 
training and experience, judges are not immune from the 
imperfections in reasoning that are widespread in the general 
population. Even if judges make their actual decisions under 
conditions that reduce those imperfections, it is implausible that the 
imperfections disappear altogether when judges are on the bench. 
Moreover, some common attributes of decisionmaking in trial 
courts—the large number of decisions that are made quickly under 
considerable pressure—may actually foster reliance on intuitive 
processes. 
The authors’ findings also provide a valuable starting point for 
inquiry into the settings in which judicial decisionmaking takes place. 
One of the central findings of social psychology is that inherent 
characteristics of individuals have less impact on their behavior, and 
situations in which they find themselves have greater impact on 
behavior, than people generally think.14 Some structures and 
procedures for decisionmaking reduce imperfections in decision 
 
 12. See Leonie Huddy, Crossing the Methodological and Disciplinary Divide: Political 
Stability, Political Change, and Research Method, in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 271, 273–74 
(Kristen Renwick Monroe ed., 2002). 
 13. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 5, at 1260–65. 
 14. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: 
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3–4 (1991). 
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processes more effectively than others.15 In the institutional design of 
courts, one goal should be to identify mechanisms that foster effective 
decisionmaking. 
One mechanism that might improve judicial decisionmaking is 
specialization of judges. Indeed, many commentators have advocated 
specialization as a means to improve judicial decisionmaking.16 The 
findings of the authors’ studies of bankruptcy judges and 
administrative law judges provide significant evidence, perhaps 
unsurprising, that the basic reasoning processes of generalist and 
specialist judges do not differ fundamentally. But those findings do 
not preclude the possibility that specialization produces other types of 
differences in decisionmaking. The extent of the specialization that 
exists in the American judiciary—an extent greater than is generally 
recognized—enhances the importance of any differences in 
decisionmaking that result from specialization. 
II.  THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL SPECIALIZATION 
An inquiry into judicial specialization must begin by considering 
what that term means. Specialization in any area of human activity 
has multiple facets.17 For instance, restricting a court’s jurisdiction to a 
particular geographical area represents one form of specialization. 
Even within the category that can be called functional specialization,18 
all judges—or at least all those who serve full-time—are specialized 
simply by doing the job of a judge. When people refer to 
specialization in the judiciary, they usually mean another form of 
functional specialization, defined in terms of case type. Generalist 
judges hear a wide range of cases; specialists hear a narrow range.19 
 
 15. See Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra note 3, at 29–43. 
 16. See sources cited infra note 32. 
 17. See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 28–35 (2d ed. 1961). 
 18. I use the term functional specialization to refer to specialization on the basis of the type 
of work that people do. See id. at 21. 
 19. Subject matter specialization can be defined in terms of cases as well as judges. 
Specialization by judges, the more familiar dimension, concerns the extent to which judges focus 
on narrow sets of cases. The other dimension, which may be called concentration of cases, 
concerns the extent to which a particular type of case is decided by a narrow set of judges. See 
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 823, 826–27 (1977); Richard L. Revesz, 
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 1111, 1121–
30 (1990). Concentration of cases can be consequential for judicial decisionmaking, but in this 
Response, I focus on specialization by judges. 
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I refer to “judges” rather than “courts” because the judge is the 
appropriate unit to consider. To the extent that specialization by case 
type affects what courts do, it is primarily because individual judges 
do work that has only a limited range in its subject matter. One 
implication of the distinction between courts and judges is that 
organization charts of court systems may be misleading about the 
extent and form of specialization. The state and federal court systems 
have a good many courts that are formally specialized.20 But there is a 
good deal of specialization within state trial courts that statewide 
organization charts do not disclose.21 In large trial courts, judges are 
often assigned to hear specific types of cases rather than the full range 
of cases that fall within the court’s jurisdiction. The extent of that 
form of specialization has grown with the movement to establish 
entities that participants and commentators have called problem-
solving courts, such as drug courts, mental health courts, and 
domestic violence courts.22 Largely because of this specialization 
 
 20. A partial list of existing and former specialized federal courts is at the website of the 
Federal Judicial Center. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc. 
gov/public/home.nsf/hisc (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). Organization charts of the state court 
systems are presented in COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2007, at 16–67 (2008), available at http://www.ncsconline. 
org/D_Research/csp/2007_files/Introduction%20to%20State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statist
ics.pdf. 
 21. For instance, the organization chart of the Illinois courts portrays a single trial court, 
the Circuit Court. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 20, at 29. But the Circuit Court of 
Cook County is divided into divisions and departments that hear specific types of cases. STATE 
OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY: AN INFORMATIONAL GUIDE 3–6 (rev. ed. 
2009), available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/publications/pdf/Informational-Guide.pdf. 
Both the Circuit Court of Cook County and its predecessors also have created some specialized 
courtrooms for specific types of criminal offenses or defendants, even prior to the development 
of problem-solving courts. See ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 90–93 
(1965) (drug court); MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN 
PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 119–240 (2003) (domestic relations court, morals court, and boys’ 
court); Leslie Baldacci, 200 Defendants Come and Go Daily in Gun Court, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 1992, at 7 (gun court). There is a degree of unofficial specialization in the federal 
courts, primarily through case and opinion assignment. On opinion assignment, see Edward K. 
Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 (2008). 
 22. Problem-solving courts have been defined in different ways. According to one scholar, 
“the essential ingredients are enhanced judicial oversight, lengthier case management (including 
post-sentencing supervision), and a general philosophy of restorative rather than retributive 
justice.” Jeffrey A. Butts, Introduction: Problem-Solving Courts, 23 L. & POL’Y 121, 121 (2001). 
A participant in the movement to establish problem-solving courts says of initiatives to establish 
problem-solving courts that “they all seek to use the authority of courts to address the 
underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems of the justice system, and 
the social problems of communities.” Greg Berman, “What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?” 
Problem Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 78 (2000). On types of problem-solving 
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within courts, a substantial proportion of American judges each hear 
a relatively narrow subset of the cases that come to the courts. 
Judicial specialization takes different forms, and I should make 
several distinctions. The first is between long-term and short-term 
specialization. Some judges have permanent assignments to particular 
types of cases, including, by definition, judges who serve on 
specialized courts. Bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases so 
long as they retain their positions. In contrast, within state courts, 
judges often are assigned to particular types of cases for specified or 
unspecified periods, moving from one subject matter to another over 
time.23 The effects of specialization on judges’ decisionmaking 
processes are probably greater when judges are permanently assigned 
to a particular class of cases. Among other things, judges’ awareness 
that they will continue to hear the same types of cases for a long 
period can affect their thinking. 
The second distinction is between full-time and part-time 
specialization. Judges who serve solely on specialized courts hear only 
cases within the jurisdiction of those courts, and judges who specialize 
within state trial courts usually focus on a single type of case for some 
period of time. In contrast, some judges move back and forth between 
a broad docket and a narrower one. This has been true of some of the 
specialized federal courts, such as the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, whose judges are drawn from the district courts 
and courts of appeals as needed.24 Similarly, some state trial judges 
devote only part of their time to the specialized dockets of problem-
solving courts such as mental health courts and homeless courts 
because those dockets do not include enough business to occupy 
 
courts, see GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-
SOLVING JUSTICE 8–9, 190–95 (2005); Pamela M. Casey & David B. Rottman, Problem-Solving 
Courts: Models and Trends, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 36–49 (2005). 
 23. On assignment practices and rotation of assignments in the Circuit Court of Cook 
County (Illinois), see Herbert Jacob, The Governance of Trial Judges, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 
10–15 (1997). 
 24. Past examples include the Emergency Court of Appeals (which heard cases involving 
price controls during and after World War II), the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals 
(which heard cases involving price controls and other economic regulations in the 1970s and 
1980s), the Special Court, Regional Rail Reorganization Act (which heard cases growing out of 
the reorganization of freight railroads in the Northeast), and the Special Counsel Panel (which 
chose special counsel to investigate criminal matters in the executive branch). These courts are 
discussed in Theodore W. Ruger, The Judicial Appointment Power of the Chief Justice, 7 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 341, 359–67 (2004). On the establishment of the special court under the Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, see Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 102–03 
(1974). 
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judges full time. Even if a judge focuses on a particular subject matter 
for only one court session a month,25 that focus can shape how a judge 
approaches cases. But a full-time specialization has greater potential 
to influence that approach. 
The third distinction concerns the breadth of the cases that a 
specialized court or a subunit of that court hears. Specialization by 
judges is not a dichotomy. Rather, it falls along a continuum. There is 
room for disagreement about the relative breadth of different sets of 
cases, but clearly some specialized judges hear a wider array of cases 
than others. The public law jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court26 and the “hodge-podge”27 jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are considerably broader 
than the jurisdiction of the United States Tax Court. A judge who 
hears a full range of criminal cases and no civil cases is a specialist, 
but not to the same degree as a judge who hears only cases in which 
defendants are charged with domestic violence. The extent of any 
effects of specialization should vary with the breadth of a judge’s 
specialized field. 
A final distinction concerns specialization within criminal law. 
Subject matter specialization in that field can be similar to 
specialization in other fields in that it is based on case type. But in 
criminal law, some courts specialize by defendant type.28 The most 
widespread examples of specialization by defendant type are juvenile 
courts. Other defendant-defined courts include homeless courts,29 
mental health courts,30 and drug courts that deal with an array of 
offenses allegedly committed by people who are addicted to drugs 
 
 25. At least for several years, the San Diego Homeless Court met once a month. Charlie 
LeDuff, Lifting Hurdles as the Homeless Rebound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2004, at A14. 
 26. See David W. Craig, The Court for Appeals—and Trials—of Public Issues: The First 25 
Years of Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth Court, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 321, 323 (1995). 
 27. Diane P. Wood, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Generalist 
Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at the Eighth Annual Judge Irving L. Goldberg Lecture 
Series (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1765 (1997). 
 28. The Court of Federal Claims may also be considered a specialist by (civil) defendant 
type because it hears only cases brought against the federal government. 
 29. The prototype for homeless courts is the San Diego Homeless Court, established in 
1989 primarily to serve the needs of homeless military veterans. See Tony Perry, Homeless 
Court Offers New Hope for the Down and Out, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2000, at A3. 
 30. The first mental health court was established in Broward County (Fort Lauderdale), 
Florida, in 1997. See GINGER LERNER-WREN, NAT’L CTR. STATE COURTS, BROWARD’S 
MENTAL HEALTH COURT: AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO THE MENTALLY DISABLED IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2000), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ 
KIS_ProSol_Trends99-00_FlaMentalPub.pdf. 
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(rather than with drug offenses).31 It is not clear how specialization by 
subject matter and by defendant type might differ in their effects, but 
there is a potential for substantial differences. 
In a relatively brief analysis of the potential effects of judicial 
specialization, it is impossible to take these distinctions fully into 
account. But it is important to keep these distinctions in mind, 
because any generalizations about the effects of specialization apply 
more accurately to some forms of specialization than to others. 
III.  THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF SPECIALIZATION 
Advocates of judicial specialization regularly cite what they see 
as the benefits of specialization for courts’ work,32 benefits that they 
usually label as efficiency, expertise, and uniformity. Uniformity 
refers to minimizing conflicts in interpretations of the law. To the 
extent that specialization brings uniformity, that effect results from 
reducing the number of judges who decide cases in a field of law 
rather than from reducing the range of cases that particular judges 
hear.33 In contrast, commentators who associate efficiency and 
expertise with specialization expect it to result from judges’ focus on 
relatively narrow sets of cases, the dimension of specialization on 
which this Response focuses. Of course, perceptions of those benefits 
are largely responsible for the general movement toward 
specialization in government and society.34 
 
 31. The first drug court of this type was established in Miami in 1989. See Michael Isikoff & 
William Booth, Miami “Drug Court” Demonstrates Reno’s Unorthodox Approach, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at A1; Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not Jail, in Drug Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A6. 
 32. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, SPECIALIZED JUSTICE: COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRIBUNALS, AND A CROSS-NATIONAL THEORY OF SPECIALIZATION 7–19 (1990); Harold H. 
Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 330–31 (1991); David 
P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the 
Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63–68 (1975); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized 
Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 377–78; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 
76 NW. U. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (1981); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a 
Solution Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 481–82 (1983); 
Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A Lesson from the German 
Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1275–79 (2005). 
 33. For a discussion regarding the distinction between these two dimensions of 
specialization, see supra note 19. 
 34. For descriptions of these perceived benefits, see, for example, SIMON, supra note 17, at 
10, 20; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 1–60 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). 
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Efficiency is fairly straightforward. Repeating similar tasks may 
enhance efficiency by allowing people to develop routines and giving 
them greater familiarity with their tasks. Thus it seems reasonable to 
assume that judges who hear only cases involving international trade 
law process those cases more quickly than judges who hear only 
occasional international trade cases. Specialization in the judiciary 
might create certain inefficiencies, because parties would need to 
litigate jurisdictional boundaries and specialized courts might have 
too few cases to fully utilize their judges’ time. But these inefficiencies 
have nothing to do with the effects of specialization on judges’ 
thinking, so they can be left aside. 
Expertise is not so straightforward. Efficiency is a result; in 
contrast, expertise is an attribute that might produce certain results. 
For one thing, any gains in efficiency that result from specialization 
are partly the product of judges’ gaining expertise through 
concentration on a particular subject matter. What commentators 
generally mean when they talk about expertise seems to be the 
possibility that expertise will enhance the quality of court decisions: 
more expert judges, who know more about the field in which they are 
deciding cases, are more likely to get decisions right. Commentators 
make that argument most fervently about fields of law in which they 
think that judges who lack special expertise have difficulty 
understanding the issues, especially taxes and patents.35 
Getting decisions right might mean multiple things. In most 
discussions of expertise and specialization, it implicitly refers to 
applying the law to the facts properly. Alternatively, it might mean 
making the decision that best reflects a judge’s conception of good 
public policy. Different as those two meanings are, they share the 
premise that expertise improves judges’ capacities to reach decisions 
that are consistent with what they are trying to accomplish. 
Judges might be chosen to serve on specialized courts on the 
basis of preexisting expertise. This is the regular practice for the 
federal Tax Court, staffed by people who specialized in tax law as 
practitioners.36 Some judges on other specialized courts come to those 
 
 35. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 155–59 
(1973). 
 36. For the biographies of sitting and senior Tax Court judges, see U.S. Tax Court, Judges, 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009). 
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courts with relevant backgrounds.37 If judges lack expertise when they 
join a court, the expectation is that they will gain it through 
immersion in the court’s work. 
It is likely that specialization has some of the positive effects on 
the quality of decisionmaking that its advocates cite. On the other 
hand, specialization might have negative effects on quality as well.38 
Both the potential positive and negative effects of judicial 
specialization should be put in a broader framework—a framework 
that encompasses the variety of ways that specialization in a 
particular subject matter can affect how judges make decisions and, 
ultimately, the substance of their decisions. These effects fall into two 
categories: first, effects relating to judges’ immersion in a particular 
field and judicial expertise, and second, effects relating to the 
influence of interest groups in the specialized field. 
The possible positive impact of specialization on efficiency and 
on the quality of decisionmaking falls in the first category. Three 
other possible effects of immersion and expertise, actual and self-
perceived, are assertiveness, insularity, and stereotyping. 
Assertiveness grows out of the self-perception of expertise. 
Specialized judges who come to a court with experience in the subject 
matter of their court’s work or who develop that experience as judges 
can be expected to feel greater confidence in their judgment than 
their generalist counterparts. Because of this confidence, they are 
likely to be more assertive than generalists in their policymaking. One 
possibility is that they will be more willing to overturn administrative 
decisions.39 Another is that they will be more inclined to make 
sweeping decisions that change policy substantially. 
In his classic book on bureaucracy, Anthony Downs cites 
insularity as another effect of immersion in a narrow field.40 People 
come to see the decisions they make from the perspective of the field 
in which they work and give little weight to other perspectives. This 
 
 37. See Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 
47 B.C. L. REV. 105, 107, 123 (2005) (bankruptcy judges). 
 38. E.g., Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 68–74; Jordan, supra note 32, at 748; 
Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on 
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 783–88 (1983); 
Revesz, supra note 19, at 155–65; Damle, supra note 32, at 1281–86. 
 39. E.g., ISAAC UNAH, THE COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JUDICIAL 
SPECIALIZATION, EXPERTISE, AND BUREAUCRATIC POLICY MAKING 131–70 (1998); Bruff, 
supra note 32, at 332; Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 71. 
 40. ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 103–07 (1967). 
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tendency can develop in the judiciary as well.41 One possible 
manifestation of insularity concerns the authority of higher officials. 
Within organizations, highly specialized subordinates tend to accord 
less authority to their superiors than do generalists because they see 
generalist superiors as less knowledgeable than themselves.42 
Specialized judges might respond in this way to higher courts staffed 
by generalists. Indeed, this effect appears to have occurred in the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals (which was folded into the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit in 1982).43 
Stereotypes are another possible effect of judges’ immersion in a 
particular type of case. If judges hear a succession of similar cases, 
they may ascribe the attributes of past cases to current cases. The 
work of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is a possible 
example. Although the surveillance court constitutes part-time duty 
for the federal judges who sit on it, each of those judges typically 
hears several dozen requests a year for warrants to conduct electronic 
surveillance. The surveillance court almost never denies these 
requests, largely because of the lenient statutory requirements for 
approval,44 so judges may develop a strong expectation that any given 
warrant request is justified. If all district judges randomly heard 
warrant requests, that expectation might not be nearly as strong—
though even if this were the case, the outcomes might not be much 
different because of the statutory rules.45 
In a second category of potential effects, specialization by judges 
can change the relative success of the political and legal interests that 
are concerned with the subject matter of court decisions by enhancing 
the influence of certain interests. Enhanced influence may arise in the 
selection of judges and in the operation of courts. 
 
 41. E.g., Jordan, supra note 32, at 748; Damle, supra note 32, at 1281–83. 
 42. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 91–101 (1989). 
 43. See Lawrence Baum, Specialization and Authority Acceptance: The Supreme Court and 
Lower Federal Courts, 47 POL. RES. Q. 693, 693 (1994). 
 44. See James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Time for Reappraisal, 
24 INT’L LAW. 1043, 1057 (1990). 
 45. On the other hand, during the George W. Bush administration the judges on the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court demonstrated some independence, and arguably their 
familiarity with the field helped to foster that independence—or, in the term I have used in this 
Part, their assertiveness. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 164–66 (2008). 
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In the selection of judges, interest groups that care about case 
outcomes in a policy area gain a better opportunity to influence the 
selection process when a court concentrates its efforts on that field.46 
If a court hears only tax cases, then groups that care about tax policy 
need not compete with their counterparts in other fields when they 
try to exert influence over the selection of judges for a particular 
court. Further, their specialization in a court’s field of work enhances 
their legitimacy as participants in the selection process47: who knows 
more than tax lawyers about the qualifications of prospective judges 
to decide tax cases? 
Other mechanisms operate within courts themselves. Interest 
groups gain a better opportunity to influence judges who hear only a 
narrow set of cases.48 The lawyers who come before any court shape 
the attitudes of judges toward the issues they confront in a field of 
legal policy. For judges who hear cases only in one field, the 
specialized bar in that field interacts more frequently with the judges 
than it would with judges who are generalists. In turn, this interaction 
allows more chances to help shape judges’ thinking. And to the extent 
that judges benefit from the cooperation of lawyers and litigants or 
care about their approval, specialized judges are dependent on a 
narrow set of court participants. 
This enhanced opportunity for influence may have little effect if 
the competing interests balance out. But in some areas of law, one 
side holds a permanent advantage, often because it is more 
concentrated and thus better organized than its competitor. When 
government constitutes one side, as it does in courts that review 
administrative decisions, it often holds the special advantage of 
selecting judges itself. The president and Senate choose judges for 
such courts as the Tax Court and the Court of International Trade. 
Professor Lynn LoPucki has described another basis for advantage in 
a specific context. As he sees it, because debtor corporations can 
 
 46. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (1994) (“Courts become more attractive targets for 
special interest groups as their jurisdiction is narrowed.”); Revesz, supra note 19, at 1147–53. 
But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 97–105 (1995) 
(“Prevailing theory on specialized courts posits that they frequently are targeted by interest 
group activity and are more likely than are generalist courts to be ‘captured’ by powerful 
interest groups and become indirectly politicized.” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. Bruff, supra note 32, at 331–32; Currie & Goodman, supra note 32, at 70–71; Dreyfuss, 
supra note 32, at 379–80. 
 48. Bruff, supra note 32, at 332; Dreyfuss, supra note 32, at 380. 
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choose among federal districts when they file for bankruptcy, they 
can steer cases to districts in which bankruptcy judges are favorable 
to debtor corporations and their attorneys. And because bankruptcy 
judges find large corporate bankruptcy cases attractive, they have a 
strong incentive to adopt those favorable policies.49 Whether or not 
one side has an advantage in its influence over a court, the two sides 
that appear in litigation may share a point of view and thus jointly 
shape judges’ perceptions. Arguably, this is the case with the 
preference of the patent bar for a relatively lenient standard of 
patentability.50 
This list of potential effects may suggest that the negative effects 
of judicial specialization outweigh the positive consequences. That 
conclusion would be premature for several reasons. First, if 
specialization does increases efficiency and if the expertise that it 
fosters enhances the quality of decisionmaking, those benefits may 
outweigh any undesirable effects of specialization. 
Second, some potential effects of specialization that seem 
negative on their face are not necessarily so. Judicial assertiveness 
sounds negative, but at least under some circumstances it might 
improve public policy. If specialization strengthens the influence of 
certain interests over a court’s work, sometimes that enhanced 
influence too might bring about improvement in the quality of policy. 
The most important reason to be cautious in reaching 
conclusions about the desirability of judicial specialization is the 
limited information that exists on its impact. The existing scholarship 
provides only a fragmentary understanding of the extent to which the 
potential effects of judicial specialization—positive, negative, or 
mixed—actually occur.51 The dearth of information about the impact 
of specialization merits consideration. 
 
 49. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 19–24 (2005). For a different view, see Melissa B. 
Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. 
REV. 401, 403 (2006). 
 50. Baum, supra note 19, at 835. 
 51. In this respect, judicial specialization is hardly unique among issues concerning the 
quality of judging and of court performance. In large part, the fragmentary understanding of 
such issues that scholarship provides reflects formidable methodological challenges, of which 
measuring quality is perhaps the most serious. On the task of measurement, see David F. Levi & 
Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“In order to achieve a more 
reliable and useful measurement, judges must be involved in the process of arriving at the right 
characteristics to measure and the right ways to measure them.”). 
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IV.  ASCERTAINING THE EFFECTS OF SPECIALIZATION 
The possibilities that I described in the preceding Part suggest 
that specialization of judges might have significant effects on their 
work. Debates over specific proposals for specialized courts and the 
general movement toward greater specialization in the courts reflect a 
belief that such effects exist. The empirical evidence on the impact of 
specialization, however, is limited. A considerable volume of 
scholarship discusses the performance of a few specialized courts, 
such as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,52 and types of 
courts, especially juvenile courts in the states.53 But there are many 
other courts on whose work scholars have done little research, with 
the exception (in some instances) of analyses that focus on specific 
decisions or clusters of decisions. 
Even for courts on which there is substantial scholarship, that 
scholarship typically provides little systematic evidence about how 
specialization affects the work of courts. Detailed studies of the 
behavior of specialized courts offer hints, sometimes very good hints, 
about the impact of specialization. One example is Professor 
Jonathan Lurie’s study of the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces, a study that examined the court’s work in detail over its first 
three decades and thereby provided a good sense of its role in the 
military justice system.54 But direct comparisons between generalist 
and specialized courts provide the best evidence about the effects of 
giving jurisdiction to specialized judges, and only a limited number of 
such studies exist. 
To a degree, the dearth of comparative studies reflects the 
difficulty of comparing generalist and specialist judges. Sometimes, a 
good point of reference for comparison does not exist. To return to 
the example of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, nobody 
can really know how specialization has affected the court’s review of 
warrants for surveillance because nonspecialized district judges never 
 
 52. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in 
Patent Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 765–66 (2000); Timothy J. O’Hearn, Patent 
Law Reform via the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982: The Transformation of 
Patentability Jurisprudence, 17 AKRON L. REV. 453, 471–72 (1984). 
 53. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
JUVENILE COURT 109–65 (1999); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S 
JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 78–98 (1978); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An 
Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187–88 (1970). 
 54. See JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES, 1951–1980, at 71–106 (1998). 
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carried out this review. A similar difficulty arises for some other 
specialized courts such as the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
and the Court of Veterans Appeals. 
Even when generalist and specialized courts decide the same 
types of cases, efforts to compare them can run into measurement 
problems. The federal district courts and the Tax Court both hear 
challenges to tax assessments by the Internal Revenue Service at the 
trial level. For this reason, comparison of the two is attractive. But 
differences between the two in jurisdiction and procedure complicate 
the task of comparison.55 Because of these differences, intercourt 
comparisons of the proportions of decisions favoring the Internal 
Revenue Service and taxpayers are likely to be misleading. Scholars 
have done useful research comparing the Tax Court and district 
courts,56 but they have not yet provided a clear picture of the impact 
of specialization on these courts’ policies. 
Still, meaningful comparisons are possible. In those instances in 
which jurisdiction is transferred from generalist to specialized courts, 
scholars can use records of both case outcomes and doctrinal 
positions to estimate the effects of the jurisdictional change, so long 
as they take into account possible changes in the composition of the 
cases that go to court. The transfer of patent infringement litigation 
from the federal courts of appeals to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit is one instance in which there is enough evidence to 
make clear how the jurisdictional change affected judicial policy.57 
 
 55. See David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 17, 24–29. The most important difference is that the Tax Court hears cases brought 
by people before they have paid their taxes, while the district courts hear lawsuits to recover 
money that people have already paid. This difference in itself ensures that the samples of cases 
heard by the Tax Court and the district courts are not entirely comparable. 
 56. See, e.g., Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts 
and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136–41 (2005); 
Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 473, 474–75 (2002); Scott Hendrickson, Examining Judicial Independence: 
Article I v. Article III Courts 94–145 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington 
University) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For another comparative study of review of 
administrative decisions by generalist and specialized federal courts, see UNAH, supra note 39, 
at 131–70. 
 57. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 337–38 (2003) (discussing the shift to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit and the resulting policy changes); Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85–
91 (2006) (same); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: 
A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1–7 (2003) (same); Gerald Sobel, The Court 
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Further, with appropriate controls for relevant differences, scholars 
can systematically compare generalist and specialized courts that hear 
the same kinds of cases. If comparisons of case outcomes between the 
district courts and the Tax Court are misleading, analysis of the legal 
doctrines they have adopted would produce more meaningful 
information with which to compare their policy positions. 
The states provide abundant opportunities for analysis of both 
changes that occur when jurisdiction over a field is transferred from 
generalist to specialized courts and differences between generalist 
and specialized courts that hear similar cases. Studies can compare 
the processes and outputs of specialized courts with those of the 
generalist judges who formerly handled the same type of case in the 
same jurisdiction. Further, because each type of problem-solving 
court exists in only a limited number of jurisdictions, their work can 
be compared with the work of generalist courts in similar 
jurisdictions. One set of scholars took advantage of that opportunity 
in their study of the Midtown Community Court in New York City, 
comparing its actions with those of a generalist court in the same 
borough.58 Similar studies could be done of an array of other 
specialized courts that exist in some states and localities but not in 
others. 
Because this is an important issue, scholars could make a 
valuable contribution by adding to the body of empirical research on 
the impact of judicial specialization. Because of the difficulties 
involved in analyzing this impact and the limited scholarly attention 
that is given to this task, however, any growth in this body of research 
is likely to be slow. 
In the meantime, the limited knowledge about the impact of 
specialization suggests the need for both scholars and participants in 
the policymaking process to be careful when making judgments about 
that impact. In debates over proposals for specialized courts, 
arguments about good or bad consequences of specialization are 
common even in the absence of much evidence about those 
 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and 
Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1092–105 (1988) (same). 
 58. MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 109–38 (2000). The court was established 
to hear cases involving criminal offenses such as prostitution and disorderly conduct that 
advocates of the court perceived as damaging to the community and inadequately handled by 
the courts. Id. at 1–2. 
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consequences.59 In particular, people who discuss the merits of 
proposals for specialized courts tend to conclude from anecdotal 
evidence or no direct evidence at all that certain forms of 
specialization improve courts’ work. That tendency is reflected in the 
speed with which some types of specialization, such as juvenile courts 
and drug courts, have diffused from place to place.60 Both 
policymakers and scholarly commentators should be slow to reach 
conclusions about the desirability of judicial specialization in its 
various forms until scholars add substantially to the current body of 
knowledge about the effects of specialization on the behavior of 
judges. 
 
 59. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 35, at 154. 
 60. In the opinion of one judge, “Perhaps the most startling thing about the drug court 
phenomenon is that drug courts have so quickly become fixtures of our jurisprudence in the 
absence of satisfying empirical evidence that they actually work.” Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug 
Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1479–80 (2000). 
